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Self-censorship is one of the biggest threats to press freedom. Press freedom, as well as 
freedom of the expression, is an indicator of a society’s freedom and democracy. If the media 
cannot act freely, it can impact society’s ability to function as a democracy. Journalists often face 
pressures from various power structures to engage in self-censorship. While journalistic self-
censorship has been examined in a number of different countries, no studies of journalistic self-
censorship in Bangladesh have been undertaken or no studies have been undertaken to see what 
factors influence journalists to exercise self-censorship or to figure out reasons that make 
journalists in Bangladesh filter media content. Bangladesh’s unique history with journalism and 
expressive freedom makes Bangladesh an interesting site for the examination of journalistic self-
censorship. Relying on an analysis of statements, writings and interviews of 38 journalists, the 
study revealed six factors that force journalists in Bangladesh to exercise self-censorship. The 
factors are: legal barriers, governmental interference, ownership, advertising, partisanship as 
unprofessional activity, and religion. This study found that the comments from journalists and 
media experts most frequently identify legal barriers, government interference, and partisanship 
as unprofessional activity as the greatest influences on self-censorship. Those institutional forces 
iii 
punish journalists who violate legal standards or do not reinforce the beliefs of the government 
or political party. Journalists who do reinforce those beliefs are rewarded with access to 
information, governmental positions, opportunities to travel and other rewards not commonly 
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Self-censorship is one of the biggest threats to press freedom. Press freedom, as well as 
freedom of the expression, is an indicator of a society’s freedom and democracy. If the media 
cannot act freely, it can impact society’s ability to function as a democracy. Journalists often face 
pressures from various power structures to engage in self-censorship. In this thesis, I examine the 
role self-censorship plays in the creation of Bangladeshi journalistic content. As Bangladeshi 
media outlets do not have any legal or professional accountability mechanism (as it goes against 
the spirit of freedom of expression and press freedom), self-accountability becomes a key 
element in the production of journalistic content. And often, along with self-accountability 
comes self-censorship. And while self-accountability is often viewed as being a good for which 
to strive, self-censorship is often viewed as being something to be avoided—something that 
limits journalistic freedom. This thesis examines how self-censorship by Bangladeshi journalists 
can limit the expression of ideas. It also can be employed as a technique that allows journalists to 
continue to do their work. 
Since its inception in 1971, Bangladesh has had a unique confrontational political system. 
Its society is sharply polarized over what should be the nationalistic identity of the country. The 
country’s two major political camps – one led by Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the 
other by its arch-enemy Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – pursue politics based on two 
different nationalisms, Bengali nationalism and Bangladeshi nationalism respectively, resulting 
in a never-ending political confrontation in Bangladesh. Political scientists opine the Bangladeshi 




identity and political philosophy and that debate has resulted in sustained political instability and 
uncertainty in the country (Hossain, 2015). When Bangladesh’s longstanding political crisis is 
rooted in the clash of nationalisms (Maniruzzman, 2016), it is not surprising that journalism 
reflects that polarization.  Having a long career as a political reporter in Bangladesh, I have seen 
how much the media outlets are polarized on the question of politics. Most of them are either 
aligned with any of the two political camps or controlled by politically influential individuals 
(Home Office, UK, 2017, p. 9 & 20; Rahman, 2012, p.85). I have seen how news reports were 
slanted to suit the owner or political masters, why critical questions were not asked, and how 
sensitive yet urgent topics were avoided. I have also seen how individual reporters worked like 
political activists. This is reflected in the types of questions journalists address to policymakers 
and political leadership, but also in how political leadership favor certain reporters and certain 
media to give their delicate information.  
Observing this interplay between journalists and political leadership is really the 
foundation of this thesis. I strive to better understand this relationship by examining how socio-
political factors push Bangladeshi media and journalists to exercise self-censorship. Drawing on 
published writings, videos, and interviews with 38 journalists, this study is an attempt to better 
understand the interplays between journalists and the socio-political forces that help shape 
journalistic content.  
The study found that six factors are incredibly important in the context of Bangladeshi 
journalism. Bangladeshi journalists and media experts said that the country’s legal structure, 
influence from the government or the ruling power structure, influence stemming from media 
ownership, influence from advertisements, individual journalist’s ideology or socio-political 




commonly discussed by journalists and media experts in the articles and interviews, were legal 
structures, governmental influence, and political partisanship of journalists as unprofessional 
activity. Although religion is rarely acknowledged by journalists, this study suggests that it might 
have a wider impact on the country’s politics and thus on journalism as religion and religious 
affairs are deeply rooted in Bangladesh’s politics and society. All of the six factors that push 
journalists and Bangladeshi media to self-censor are well-linked with the country’s politics. It 
appears that journalism and politics are nothing but the two sides of the same coin. In other 
words, the country’s politics play an instrumental role in shaping the media content in 
Bangladesh. 
Chapter Descriptions 
This project consists of five chapters. The first chapter features a brief introduction into 
my interest in the topic followed by the chapter descriptions. 
Chapter two includes a description of what is self-censorship. While there is a strong 
debate over the very concept and the definition of self-censorship among the scholars, there are 
arguments both in favor of self-censorship and against it. Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes 
argue that self-censorship is a natural duty of a responsible citizen and an essential condition of 
civil peace while other philosophers and scholars believe that self-censorship violates the 
freedom of expression and norms of free speech. However, scholars categorize several types of 
self-censorship like public self-censorship, private self-censorship, private self-censorship by 
proxy, private self-censorship by self-restraint, true self-censorship and justified self-censorship. 
The chapter also talks about how self-censorship affects journalism. Scholars argue that 
journalistic self-censorship is a “subtle, hidden, and insidious” phenomenon (Lee, 1998, p. 57). 




of Influence Model, Bar-Tal’s (2017) seven elements and aspects of self-censorship that 
characterize media self-censorship, and Daniel C Hallin’s (1987) three concentric spheres of 
journalism’s world of political discourse: 1) sphere of consensus, 2) sphere of legitimate 
controversy, and 3) sphere of deviance.  This chapter concludes with the research questions that 
guide this project and the methodology that will be used to answer those questions. 
Chapter three includes a description of the history of news media in Bangladesh, its legal 
and constitutional structure and its ownership pattern. The press has played a key role in the 
development of a national consciousness in Bangladesh, even from before its birth. Still, it has 
witnessed several waves of ups and downs with the authorities clamping down on the press from 
the inception of Bangladesh. Apart from inheriting some stringent laws from British colonial 
rule, the country has enacted and is still enacting harsh laws that curb press freedom, although 
the country’s constitution guarantees freedom of expression. The chapter also discusses how 
media ownership is connected, if not directly controlled, with the confrontational politics. The 
chapter includes a description of how religion and nationalism interplays in Bangladeshi politics 
and thus in journalism. The chapter also sheds light on the journalistic associations and on what 
being a professional journalist means in Bangladesh. 
Chapter four reveals the findings of the study, including description of the factors which 
push Bangladeshi media to exercise self-censorship. The country’s legal structure, influence 
from the government or the ruling power structure, influence stemmed from the media 
ownership, influence from advertisements, individual journalist’s ideology or socio-political 
view and religion are found to be the factors that push journalists and media practitioners to 
exercise self-censorship. Chapter five contains the conclusion which summarizes what the 











Literature Review, Methodology and Research Questions 
 
 
In this chapter, I will highlight the literature that guides in my thesis, the research 
questions that will guide my study, and the methodology that I will use to answer those 
questions.  
Defining Self-censorship? 
The term self-censorship is self-interpretative. It’s an act of self-restraint. Self-censorship 
denotes the act or action of refraining by oneself from expressing something (such as a thought, 
point of view, or belief) that others could deem objectionable. Self-censorship is the act of 
censoring or classifying one's own discourse. This is done out of fear of, or deference to, the 
sensibilities or preferences of others and without overt pressure from any specific people, group 
of people, party, social institution and/or any socio-political authority. Self-censorship is 
ubiquitous in every society. Friends self-censor when they deliberately avoid a topic that might 
hurt their friends; spouses self-censor when they do not express what they truly feel for the sake 
of domestic harmony; employees self-censor when they remain silent even after facing injustice 
because they do not want to incur the displeasure of their superiors; police officers or 
investigators or journalists self-censor when they withhold information that may jeopardize an 
ongoing inquiry; a newspaper self-censors when it does not publish news that conflicts with the 
ideology that it espouses. Even the populace of a certain nation or ethnic groups exercises self-
censorship while talking about the past misdeeds carried out by their ancestors. For instances, 
Dutch people and Dutch institutions exercise self-censorship while speaking about the liberation 




Belgians, Argentineans, Peruvians, Americans, and the people of other nations with a view to 
concealing immoral acts committed by the ancestors (Bar-Tal, 2017). 
Self-censorship has all along been a part and parcel of human communications. It was 
exercised and is now exercised in every social sphere from antiquity to date, having no temporal 
and spatial boundaries (Baltussen and Davis, 2015). The ubiquity of self-censorship proves that 
it is an integral socio-cultural phenomenon. Philosophers and scholars have long debated the pros 
and cons of the phenomenon in human communications. Jonathan Parkin (2015) argues that 
political philosopher Thomas Hobbes concealed his own political, religious, and scientific views 
for the sake of self- preservation and made self- censorship a centerpiece of his political theory. 
Humans need to exercise self-censorship at times to not hurt others, or to uphold the 
freedom of others. Scholars have argued that people exercise self-censorship either to avoid 
“external negative sanctions” or to gain something positive (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 9). Some argue, it 
is human instinct for people to try to conceal their wrongdoings and that is reflected in society 
and social institutions like the state, political parties and religious organizations as their 
characters are eventually shaped by the characters of the individuals (Bar-Tal, 2017). Hobbes 
argues that self-censorship is a natural duty of a responsible citizen and an essential condition of 
civil peace as, Hobbes thinks, the political problem is “the unrestrained expression of the beliefs 
and opinions of autonomous selves pursuing their own goods; the inevitable clash between them 
results in a state of war” (Parkin, 2015, p. 300). But there is a group of philosophers and scholars 
who believe that self-censorship violates the freedom of expression or free speech which is 
widely held to be one of the central values of societies as it has taken the center stage in the 




The conflict here is between freedom and responsibility. Cultural and social conventions 
which are often referred to as “civility” impose limits on us as to what we should do and what 
not to do. Civility is an associational pressure (Ramsoomair, 2019). Ramsoomair argues that 
civility also has the potential to degrade the quality of discourse, leaving “us too deferential to 
majority opinion” (2019, p. 572). Chamlee-Wright (2019) argues that self-censorship fosters 
both positive and negative outcomes. Peter Wood (2019) argues that humans are moved to bury 
their ideas for many reasons. “Cowardice and conformity-for-conformity’s-sake” to avoid hassle, 
he suspects, is responsible for most self-censorship. He, however, holds that “governing one’s 
tongue” or self-censorship is a good idea. Governing your tongue, he thinks, means wisely 
choosing when to speak (Wood, 2019, p. 604).  
John Horton says self-censorship “can, for good reasons, give rise to some normative 
ambivalence and that its ethical status is less straightforward than is that of ordinary cases of 
censorship” (Horton, 2011, p. 92). He argues that self-censorship has its specific features that 
make it problematic and holds that self-censorship should be “morally objectionable” like the 
“other forms of censorship” (Horton, 2011, p. 102).  
Given the myriad factors that characterize self-censorship, the types of self-censorship 
can in a nutshell be distinguished based on a question as to whose will is dominant. Is the agent 
who is self-censoring genuinely the author of the act or a mere performer or only playing a role 
of instrument?  Horton (2011) argues that the agents/persons/institutions/ who will have an 
“element of reluctance, and a feeling of resentment” while censoring should not be called the 
self-censors thanks to their unwillingness to censor (p. 100). Horton contends that the self-




p. 102). According to Horton, those who censor themselves “on their own volition and being 
uncoerced by others” are the true self-censors (Horton, 2011, p. 99, 100). 
Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann (2013) argue that the complex phenomena of self-
censorship cannot be suitably understood without identifying two types of the phenomenon. One 
is public self-censorship and the other is private self-censorship. Public self-censorship is 
exercised in response to an externally existing censor or public censor. Private self-censorship is 
exercised in the absence of an external censor, i.e. without any coercion. They defined these two 
types of self-censorship in relations with the principle of free speech of the censee (the person 
who censors). In turn, they recognize two types of private self-censorship: self-censorship by 
proxy and self-censorship by self-restraint. Private self-censorship which is exercised through an 
individual's “internalization of some external set of values,” such as “the norms of an 
association,” is called Private Self-censorship by Proxy. The second type of private self-
censorship, exercised in response to an individual's suppression of his or her own attitudes even 
in the absence of an explicitly external or public influence, they term private self-censorship by 
self-restraint. They say this happens when an individual adopts a personal set of values that 
constrain the expression of their attitudes like “a person may develop a personal code where it is 
deemed impermissible to express obscene language or to speak about money in public company” 
(Cook and Heilmann, 2013, p. 187). They argue that private self-censorship by self-constraint 
can be defended as the most ethically justifiable because individuals are acting on their own 
accord absent coercion (2013, p. 191).   
Bar-Tal (2017) defines the self-censorship of information as an act of “intentionally” and 




of “formal obstacles” like official censorship. He argues that such self-censorship often obstructs 
the “functioning of a democratic society” (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 4). 
While outlining a conceptual framework of self-censorship, Bar-Tal (2017) elaborates 
seven elements or aspects of self-censorship which helps define the dynamics that characterize 
media self-censorship. They are: 1) information versus opinion, 2) limitations of self-censorship, 
3) content of the withheld information, 4) types of self-censorship, 5) types of self-censors, 6) 
experiencing dilemma, and 7) self-censorship and the society. Bar-Tal finds nothing wrong with 
self-censoring opinion, but the self-censorship of information raises questions (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 
6). Second, he differentiates between “formally enforced self-censorship” and “socially enforced 
self-censorship” and holds that the former is not self-censorship, but rather censorship (Bar-Tal 
2017, p. 6). Third, Bar-Tal argues that the “content of the withheld information” influences the 
dynamics (characteristics) of self-censorship. The characteristics of the phenomenon vary 
depending on what type of impacts the content would put on people (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 7). 
Fourth, the types of the self-censorship needs to be assessed (i.e., self-censoring by gatekeepers, 
by the citizens and/or first-hand information or second-hand information) (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 7). 
In the category of types of self-censors, Bar-Tal shows how a wide range of people and 
institutions exercise self-censorship for various reasons that ranges from hiding wrongdoings, 
crimes, guilt, as well as hiding crimes like rape and abuse by its victims. He argues that 
bystanders also self-censor to avoid hassles. Bar-Tal points out that people exposed to various 
documents and/or evidence often self-censor fearing that revealing that information might be 
harmful to the people or a group of people or individual/s or for society (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 8). 
Sixth, Bar-Tal identifies an individual’s dilemma to self-censor, pointing out that the level of the 




factors. He argues that if there is no dilemma about revealing the information in a situation when 
the person does not consider the information worthy to reveal, then that should not be called self-
censorship (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 8). And finally, Bar-Tal argues that the dynamics of self-
censorship varies depending on the relationship between the self-censor and society. Bar-Tal 
points out four motivating factors and four contributing factors to self-censorship. First a 
motivating factor is the human desire to not harm the image of the ingroup, a second factor is to 
avoid “negative sanctions” and gain positive sanctions, a third motivation is “intrinsic” (Bar-Tal 
points out that people self-censor to maintain their “own positive self-view”), and a fourth factor 
is the desire to uphold one’s own ideology and belief. The four contributing factors are: the 
context of the group, individual factors (characteristics of the person who has the information), 
the content types and circumstantial factors (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 9-10).  
From the above discussion, it is clear that self-censorship exercised by gatekeepers has 
the potential to have a broader impact on society than self-censorship by individuals. John 
Horton is of the opinion that the censoring agent – the individual or the institution – who is 
exercising the practice (self-censor) should, in some sense, be “the author of the act” (self-
censoring), rather than the mere performer/instrument (the agent) in response to impending 
threats (Horton, 2011, p. 98).  
Self-censorship and Journalistic Work  
Drawing on these two criteria, media outlets and journalists are agents of self-censorship 
whose acts of self-censorship impact all of society. There has been a long debate over the issue 
of self-censorship in the media. The everyday work of journalism involves many difficult ethical 




words, angles, pictures, and video/audio clips. The founder of the Ethical Journalism Network 
and former General Secretary of International Federation of Journalists, Aidan White, calls it 
self-regulation, not self-censorship (White, 2014). He maintains that self-regulation in media 
“remains at the heart of producing credible, trustworthy and timely journalism” (White, 2014). 
Terming “telling everything they know to a public whose right to know is sacred” is the media 
industry’s fundamental mission, political cartoonist and author Ted Rall (2019), however, holds 
that “well-intentioned, self-imposed ethical guidelines” also get in the way of this fundamental 
mission (Rall, 2019). 
A survey of nearly 300 journalists and news executives in the United States in 2000 by 
the Pew Research Center and the Columbia Journalism Review reveals that self-censorship is a 
common phenomenon in the news media (Pew Research, 2000). One-fourth of the local and 
national newsmen say they “purposely avoided newsworthy stories”, while nearly same 
percentage of newsmen acknowledge that they soften the “tone of stories to benefit the interests 
of their news organizations” (Pew Research, 2000). According to the survey, some 41 percent of 
journalists say they exercise either or both of the two practices (Pew Research, 2000). 
A survey of about 1,000 European journalists by the Council of Europe reveals that 
because of intimidation and threats, over 30 percent of the journalists said they tone down 
“sensitive or critical stories” and another 15 per cent said they abandon these type of stories 
altogether (Council of Europe, n.d.). One-fifth of surveyed journalists said they shape their news 
articles in a way that suits their organizations’ interests (Council of Europe). Referring to a report 
from the Ethical Journalism Network, White (2014) says Turkey’s major media outlets censor 




journalists in many parts of the world, including in Russia, China, Iran, Egypt, North Korea, 
Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines routinely censor themselves to avoid physical, violence 
persecution and assassination (White, 2014). 
Terming journalistic self-censorship a “subtle, hidden, and insidious” phenomenon, Chin-
Chuan Lee (1998) holds that paradoxes have shaped “inconsistent and uneven patterns” of self-
censorship in the media (Lee, 1998, p. 57). He observes that self-censorship can be embedded in 
the everyday media practices in such a manner that journalists would not even know that they are 
self-censoring. He fears that the “spiral of silence process” may set in if a certain “climate of 
opinion pervades in the news environment” (Lee, 1998, p. 57).  
Drawing on a study of Hong Kong media, Lee (1998) points out how self-censorship is 
used in the exercise of power: dodging political controversy, hiring of pro-government or pro-
party or pro-ideology people to assume responsible posts, shifting of editorial tone in line with 
the change of governments, redesign of space to reduce a newspaper’s political overtone, firing 
of high-risk contributors, dissemination of writing guidelines on “sensitive stories”, and the 
placement of sensitive stories in obscure positions (Lee, 1998, p. 57). He argues that the 
censoring agents use tactics like “institutional absorption and friendship through honor,” respect, 
gifts, and banquets and withholding of honor, benefits, and information in order to push 
journalists to exercise self-censorship (Lee, 1998, p. 58).  Journalists, on the other hand, self-
censor to obtain scoops and interviews from the respective power structure (Lee, 1998, p. 58). 
Lee also found that journalists belonging to the same ideological group are less likely to fear 




Francis L.F. Lee and Joseph Chan (2009) contend that much of press self-censorship is 
exercised without the managers of the news organizations “explicitly ordering it” and without the 
frontline journalists knowingly doing it. But they maintain that staff and frontline journalists toe 
the line of the newspaper/media outlets (and its editorial policy) even if superiors do not always 
directly command them as to how to work on a story (Lee and Chan, 2009, p. 114). 
Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese (2013) argue that the media content is essentially 
a social construction, given the multitude of factors that sway the media content. They are of the 
opinion that journalists view and interpret the world in terms of their own image of reality, their 
own beliefs, values and norms. They hold that the media content is influenced by “media 
workers’ socialization and attitudes”, “media organizations and routines”, “other social 
institutions and forces” and also observe that the media content is a “function of ideological 
positions” and often “maintains the status quo” (Shoemaker and Reese, 2013, p. 8). Given the 
multitude of factors that influence the media content, they have developed a theoretical 
framework called the “Hierarchy of Influence Model” in which they argue that the media portray 
a view that is influenced by multitude of factors on at least “five levels of influence” (Shoemaker 
and Reese, 2013, p. 8).  The five levels that influence media content are: social systems, social 
institutions, media organizations, routine practices, and individuals (Shoemaker and Reese, 2013, 
p. 9). The “hierarchy of influences” model explains how the multiple socio-political forces and 
newsworkers’ individual factors play a role in the making of news and how they interact in the 
process. While Shoemaker and Reese don’t deal directly with self-censorship, their five levels of 
influence help us understand how influences on journalists come from many different places of 





The Influence of Social Systems 
Shoemaker and Reese (2013) contend that the social system is the foundation from which 
all media content is constructed although it does not determine the exact nature of the content (p. 
93). Reese and Shoemaker (2013) argue that four intertwined social “subsystems” – ideology, 
economy, politics and culture, which are intertwined in many ways – sway media content (p. 69). 
They also argue that a “national system” is the essential focus of the news (p. 64). They also hold 
that the “news paradigm structures stories so that events are interpreted from the perspective of 
powerful interests” (p. 65). 
Agreeing with the notion of the British Marxist school of media studies that the dominant 
ideology of the society is linked to the norms and practices of “journalists’ occupational 
ideology” (82), Reese and Shoemaker (2013) contend that “whether ideological influences on the 
mass media are judged to be good or bad, positive or negative, functional or dysfunctional, 
depends largely on point of view” (p. 71). Subscribing to the idea of Siebert et al that the “press 
always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it 
operates,” Reese and Shoemaker argue political systems influence media (p. 72-73). They hold 
that the “process of communication is central in the development and evolution of culture, as the 
media help constitute how people think of themselves and how they construct values and norms” 
(p. 73). Reese and Shoemaker point out that media “accept the boundaries, values, and 
ideological rules of the game established and interpreted by elite sources” while accepting 
“valueless reporting” as the norm (p. 84). 
Media scholars are of the opinion that politicians give reporters access to delicate 
information only to create their own narratives through the media. Political communication 




made it the slogan of his PR firm (Bennett, 2012, p. 111). Referring to Luntz’s argument that: “a 
compelling story, even if factually inaccurate, can be more emotionally compelling than a dry 
recitation of the truth” (Bennett, 2012, p. 114), political scientist W. Lance Bennett says news is 
the “strategically constructed versions of events” as it “often translates the political world into 
personal terms based on the existing emotions and values of audiences” (p. 118). 
The Influence of Social Institutions 
Agreeing with Castells’ idea of the media as a “generalized institutionalized space” (p. 
95), Shoemaker and Reese (2013) argue that this space maintains a fluid, complex and multi-
layered relationship with other social institutions (p. 96) as it has a relation to “the welfare of 
society or to the success of democratic government” (p.107). Social institutions and other forces 
such as sources, interests groups, media watchdogs, rival media houses, advertisers and 
audiences, public relations groups working on behalf of various social organizations, state 
machinery and media market exert extensive influence on the media content (p. 123-128). 
Introducing a theory of media objectivity, journalism historian Daniel C Hallin divides 
(1987) journalism’s world of political discourse into three concentric spheres: 1) sphere of 
consensus, 2) sphere of legitimate controversy, and 3) sphere of deviance. Based on the sphere, 
journalists decide what they should cover and how, i.e. journalists self censor based on which 
sphere information falls in. According to Hallin’s model, journalists feel no pressure to be 
objective in publishing what falls in the sphere of consensus. In other words, journalists can 
publish whatever falls in the sphere of consensus, without any reservation, as “those social 
objects are not regarded by the journalists and most of the society as controversial” (p. 116). 
Rather, journalists play a role of “an advocate or celebrant of consensus values” (p. 117). But the 




legitimate controversy” where “objectivity and balance” stand out to be the “supreme journalistic 
virtues” (p. 116) and the definition of objective journalism varies (p. 117). The sphere of 
deviance is the realm of the political actors and views which “journalists and the political 
mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard” (p. 117) and that’s why journalists 
don’t publish report on what falls in the sphere of deviance. Hallin contends that “each sphere 
has internal gradations, and the boundaries between them are often fuzzy” (p. 117). The sphere 
plays “the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate 
or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political 
conflict” (117). Hallin opines that when “political issues were broached, personalization 
transformed their meaning in a way that shifted them out of the Sphere of Legitimate 
Controversy and into the Sphere of Consensus” (p. 136). 
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002) introduced a model called the 
“Propaganda Model” in which they show that the published or printed news content is nothing 
but the residue of the “raw materials of news” and the raw materials must pass through five 
social filters to “make the raw materials fit to publish” (p. 1). The first filter is “the size, 
concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media 
firms”. This is the most powerful filter which affects news choices (p. 14) when the media news 
people are so overwhelmed by the elite domination of the media and marginalization of 
dissidents that they become convinced that they choose and interpret the news “objectively” and 
on the basis of professional news values” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p.2). Secondly, the raw 
materials of the news are filtered by the news managers, keeping in view the “revenue from the 
advertisers”. Thirdly, the raw materials of the news are filtered by the “sources” as the “mass 




necessity and reciprocity of interest” (p. 18). The fourth filter is “flak”. The media content is 
filtered to avoid flak from the audience and powerful quarters. If flak is “produced on a large 
scale, or by individuals or groups with substantial resources, it can be both uncomfortable and 
costly to the media” (p. 26). The fifth filter is “ideological filter” in which media news people 
consider anti-communism a religion as Herman and Chomsky argue that the “ideology and 
religion of anticommunism is a potent filter” (p. 31). 
Sociologist Todd Gitlin (1980) points out some “causes of story selection” in institutions 
or social conditions which exist outside the news organization. He argues that “technological 
factors, national culture, economics, the audience, powerful news sources, and the ideologies of 
the dominant social powers” sway journalists as to what stories should be selected (p. 250-251). 
Gitlin contends that the ideals of journalists are “fluid enough to protect them from seeing that 
their autonomy is bounded” and argues that journalists “systematically frame the news to be 
compatible with the main institutional arrangements of the society” (p. 269). Gitlin thinks that 
journalists’ sense of professionalism varies depending on things like “personal life-experience, 
specific organizational arrangements, and the shifting boundaries of the ideologically permissible 
in the wider society as well as within the newsroom” (p. 269). Gitlin points out that the values of 
journalists are “anchored in routines that are at once steady enough to sustain hegemonic 
principles and flexible enough to absorb many new facts; and these routines are bounded by 
perceptions of the audience's common sense and are finally accountable to the world views of 
top managers and owners. These factors shape the news; even centralized manipulations by the 
state have to respect these limits” (p. 272-273). 
Arguing that politics is primarily media politics, Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells 




between competing political and social actors” (p. 194) and this reality affects the content of the 
news on a daily basis as it (affecting media content in line with the particular political goal) is 
“one of the most important endeavors of political strategists” (p. 197-198). Castells argues that 
“while politicians feed the media, the media often feast on raw politics, either to cook it for the 
audience or to let it rot, so that the feeders become exposed, thus attracting the interest of the 
public in both cases” (p. 227-228). 
The Influence of Media Organizations 
Shoemaker and Reese (2013) argue that media outlets function following a certain 
“organizational and bureaucratic setting” having connected with ownership, roles, structure, 
profitability, platform, target audience, influence from advertisers, and market competition and 
the very nature of the structure of the media outlets – as an organization -- make it to “have an 
important impact on content” (p. 135). According to Shoemaker and Reese, organizational 
influences from media outlets can “distort journalists’ ability to objectively describe the world” 
and independent journalistic practice may evolve in pursuance of the corporate goals of the 
media outlets, leading to an impact on content (p. 157). As Shoemaker and Reese write, “By 
establishing corporate policies in line with their own interests, owners can have an unmistakable 
impact on media content” (p. 163). 
Robert W. McChesney (1999) contends that the notion of professional journalism makes 
the media organizations as the agents of “public service”. Pursuing professional journalism 
means disconnecting “the editorial process from the explicit supervision of the owners and 
advertisers of the mass media” (McChesney. 1999, p. 17). But “hypercommercialism” (p. 33), – 
the excessive influence of advertising in the media to obtain success and profit – has brought 




1999, p. 48). In professional journalism, the media content is not biased “by the dictates of 
owners and advertisers, or by the biases of the editors and reporters,” it should rather be shaped 
by the “core public service values” (McChesney, 1999, p. 49). But in the wake of “ever-greater 
corporate concentration, media conglomeration, and hypercommercialism”, McChesney holds 
that the “notion of public service – that there should be some motive for media other than profit – 
is in rapid retreat if not total collapse” in the US media (P. 76-77). 
 
Terje S. Skjerdal (2010) shows that self-censorship practice is widespread among the 
journalists of the Ethiopian state media. And the Ethiopian journalists think that the practice is 
justified because primarily of four reasons. The reasons are: “(1) relegation of ethical 
responsibility; (2) elasticity of journalistic editing; (3) confidence in critical audiences; and (4) 
adherence to social responsibility” (Skjerdal, 2010, p. 116). Various studies show that self-
censorship is encouraged in Asia in such a manner that it has turned out to be a “journalistic 
practice” (p. 236). Journalists in Asia are advised by their seniors that self-censorship is a 
‘‘responsible’’ function in order to ‘‘build and develop the nation’’ (Tapsell, 2012, p. 228). 
Tapsell found that 71 per cent of journalists in Indonesia claimed that “decisions relating to 
content might be changed because of the owner’s influence, even if the owner seldom attended 
editorial meetings” (p. 236). In the process of exercising self-censorship, the media content (in 
Indonesia) is “slanted to suit the owner, critical questions are not asked, and sensitive topics are 
avoided” (Tapsell, 2012, p. 242). Jingrong Tong (2009) shows how the self-censorship practice 
has turned out to be an “efficient way for newspaper organizations to deal with the clash between 
their interests and those of the interests of journalists and the public” in China (p. 609). With 




possibility of getting reports published at the same time as minimizing political risks” (p. 609), 
although self-censorship is rare at the individual journalist level, i.e. frontline reporters in China 
(p. 608). 
The Influence of Routine Practices 
While doing journalism, journalists exercise a set of routine practices. The routine 
practices, which are intertwined with other levels of the hierarchy model of influence, play a big 
role in mediating media content. Shedding light on the practices journalists and news managers 
go through every day, Shoemaker and Reese (2013) point out that journalists follow a certain 
routine while processing the raw materials of news until it is published or aired and in so doing, 
the process “inevitably distorts the original event” (p. 182). Routines of news work that 
journalists follow include maintaining sources (routine and expert sources), fact-checking, 
maintaining “objectivity”, audience demand, presentation format, space in the medium, narrative 
story structure, news framing, and maintaining deadlines. Shoemaker and Reese argue that these 
routines provide levers to both the journalists and the power structures outside the media 
organizations to influence the content. They argue that “media routines stem from three domains: 
audiences, organizations, and suppliers of content defensive routines prevent journalists from 
offending the audience and their sources” (p. 173). They argue that routine practices yield 
“acceptable news stories by directing news workers to take facts and events out of one context 
and reconstitute them into the appropriate format. Shoemaker and Reese think that journalists’ 
routine practices provide the “power centers on the outside”, like sources, expert sources, 
advertisers, audiences, public relation firms, with a scope to influence media content (p. 203). 




journalists’ choice of experts has an “important influence on how that meaning is shaped” (p. 
189). 
Herbert J. Gans (2003) equates news organizations with factories and points out that 
routinization is equally important for the media outlets because they need to “distribute their 
product more regularly and punctually” like other products, as news is a perishable item (p. 50). 
In so doing, journalists are heavily dependent on their sources to get the raw materials of news as 
they are to produce the product (media content) every day like a factory, without any hiatus. 
Gans considers the source-journalist relationship to be “symbiotic” and argues that the 
journalists, because of their need for a regular supply of information, cannot “alienate” their 
sources (p. 50). Gans thinks that journalists, knowingly or unknowingly, help “legitimate and 
even glorify the sources and strata from which they report” (p. 47). In this process, sources have 
the first say in the report (p. 46) and the reporters turn into messengers of the people in power 
structure, including political, governmental, and other leaders (p. 49). In so doing, Gans thinks 
that reporters’ news stories include “myths, stereotypes, and biases that are prevalent in their 
social circles and in the country’s newsrooms” (p. 57). 
Mark Fishman (1988) shows how the routine methods of gathering news influence the 
media content or determine the ideological character of the product. In the beat system, a 
routinized practice of journalists, Fishman argues, reporters are “exposed to a bureaucratic 
setting” and that bureaucratic consciousness is “invaluable for detecting news because it 
indicates where the reporters should position themselves to discover happenings not yet known” 
(p. 51). So, Fishman argues the essence of what reporters collect through “bureaucratically 
packaged activities” is a production which is produced “within the agencies they cover” (p. 52), 




to just facts.  
Pointing out that in news, facts must be “quickly identified” (p. 82), sociologist Gaye 
Tuchman (1978) argues that verification of facts is “both a political and a professional 
accomplishment” (p. 83). Tuchman holds that the bureaucratic nature of newsworkers’ routine 
allows the reporters to present the fact or the information with an “interpretive analysis” (p. 97). 
In the process of doing reporting, Tuchman argues that reporters are “engaged in the theoretic 
activity of making sense of the world by constructing meanings” (p. 87). According to Tuchman, 
reporters amass a host of “supposed facts” while checking the facts in the news and together they 
form “a web of facticity by establishing themselves as cross-referents to one another” (p. 86). 
Tuchman contends that the different approaches which are accepted as “professional tools and 
extensions of news typifications”, to set story forms lead “the reporters to the wrong 
conclusions.” And the “web of facticity” guides the reporters’ process of searching information 
or news and then puts the produced news or content in a certain frame (p. 103), suggesting that 
the facts presented in the content do not remain authentic, rather they go through some sort of 
distortion. Tuchman also makes the argument the objectivity and/or professionalism is a part of 
routine. The way the doctors tell the patients the “probable success of different medical options”, 
the “professional reporters” guide the news consumers to decide what is the truth, by adding the 
alternative truth-claims from all sides—a necessary practice of objectivity in the name of 
maintaining objectivity and “professionalism (p. 90-91).   
Warren Breed (1955) argues that every newspaper has “a policy, admitted or not”, (p. 
327), suggesting that every newspaper has its own preferred view of society and life and they 
often like to promote that policy by means of “slanting” the published news in the name of 




is “technical norms” which “deal with the operations of efficient news gathering, writing, and 
editing” and the second one is “ethical norms” which “embrace the newsman's obligation to his 
readers and to his craft and include such ideals as responsibility, impartiality, accuracy, fair play, 
and objectivity” (p. 327). Breed, however, does not think that slanting means prevarication. 
Rather, Breed points out, slanting “involves omission, differential selection and preferential 
placement, such as "featuring" a pro-policy item, "burying" an anti-policy story in an inside 
page” (p. 327).  
The Influence of Individuals 
In Shoemaker and Reese’s Hierarchy of Influence model, the individual level is the level 
where the media content gets final shape after passing through all of the levels of influence as 
individuals both “shape and are shaped by their larger institutional settings” (p. 209) and 
individual beliefs are “core to the concentric rings” (p. 244). Shoemaker and Reese argue that 
none of us can “escape having our actions affected by our personal subjectivities and life 
experiences” (p. 238). Pointing out that personal and professional factors are closely related, 
Shoemaker and Reese hold that both help “determine content, particularly to the extent that 
communicators have the power necessary to imprint their own decisions on the product” (p. 
238). Shoemaker and Reese also argue that partisan beliefs affect news decisions and such 
influence is the “strongest in those countries with a tradition of partisan advocacy” (p. 227). 
Journalism is an activism which takes place in a given society or in a given social 
condition, not in isolation in a utopia. So, it is normal that the journalism would be affected or 
influenced by the various social dynamics. Drawing on above discussion, we can see various 
socio-political factors, social system or ideologies, cultures and ethos of a particular society, the 




the complex nature of journalistic practices itself, and newsworkers’ (communicators/mediators) 
individual characteristics and ideology put considerable influence on the news content. Although 
all of the five levels of analysis have their own factors that put influence individually on the 
news content, the factors from the most micro individual level to the most macro social system 
are intertwined in many ways, reinforcing or undercutting the influence of each other.  
Research Questions 
While journalistic self-censorship has been examined in a number of different countries, 
no studies of journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh have been undertaken or no studies have 
been undertaken to see what factors influence journalists to exercise self-censorship or to figure 
out reasons that make journalists in Bangladesh filter media content. Bangladesh’s unique 
history with journalism and expressive freedom (examined in the next chapter) makes 
Bangladesh an interesting site for the examination of journalistic self-censorship. Self-
censorship, rather than being a forbidden practice, becomes a technique that journalists use to 
enable them to continue to do their work.  
This thesis will attempt to better understand journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh 
guided by the following research question: What factors do journalists see as the most important 
influence on self-censorship in Bangladesh?  
Methodology 
 Information to answer these questions was drawn from an extensive review of the articles 
by or interviews with Bangladeshi journalists and media experts.  While in-depth interviews with 
journalists would be a good way to answer these questions, it is difficult to get journalists to 
answer these questions and to assure them that their identities and what they tell the researcher 




censorship and some have given interviews (videos of these interviews are available on 
YouTube). That list appears at the end of this thesis in the Reference section (see “Sources of 
Journalistic Writings, Publications and Interviews”). To answer the research questions, I’ve 
analyzed those articles and interviews, to better understand the factors and forces within 
Bangladesh that influence journalistic self-censorship, how journalists respond to these 
pressures, and how they use self-censorship to do their work. I also did a textual analysis of the 
various newspaper articles and reports of various watchdog organizations to understand the 
dynamics that influence the media content in Bangladesh.  
To get the views of Bangladeshi journalists and media experts about the state of self-
censorship in the country, I did textual analysis of 61 published articles and video clips which 
include interviews, opinion pieces and hard-news stories; and gone through some of the 
discussions on the Bangladeshi media available on YouTube. These were obtained through a 
Google search using key terms such as: “Self-censorship in Bangladeshi media”, “self-
censorship and Bangladeshi media”, “Press freedom in Bangladesh”. I also used Bengali-
language key terms like: “সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ” (self-censorship), “শিশিয়া সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ” 
(Media self-censorship), and “গণিাধ্যমির স্বাধ্ীনতা” (press freedom).  The materials analyzed 
cover the period from 2010 to 2020. Initial searches yielded 80 newspaper articles and video 
clips, but 19 of them were eliminated because they did not touch directly on self-censorship or 
press freedom.  
The analysis yielded views on self-censorship and press freedom from 38 journalists, editors and 








History of News Media in Bangladesh 
 
Bengali journalism began in 1818 with the publication of three Bangla newspapers: 
Bengal Gazette, Digdarshan and Samachar Darpan in undivided India. Formal journalism was 
introduced by James Augustus Hicky by publishing a weekly journal named Hicky's Bengal 
Gazette in Calcutta in January 1780 (Banglapedia, 2003). The British colonial administration had 
begun its rule in the subcontinent (now India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) in 1757 which ended in 
1947. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan (comprising East Pakistan and West Pakistan) came into 
being, and in 1971 East Pakistan achieved its liberation and became the sovereign nation, 
Bangladesh. The first weekly from Dhaka, The Dacca News, was published in 1856. The Dhaka 
Prakash was first published in 1861 and the Dhaka Darpan in 1863 (Banglapedia, 2003).  
The press has played a key role in the development of a national consciousness in 
Bangladesh. For the middle class elite, the media was a critical medium for mobilizing 
nationalist public opinion, especially before and during the war of independence. Radio in 1971 
became inextricably linked to the nationalist movement and its aspirations. Subsequently, during 
the war, from April 1971 to December 1971, the rebel radio station was the most widely heard 
voice of the government (Chowdhury, 2003). The period around the birth of Bangladesh 
witnessed the publication of many newspapers and magazines that includes Banglar Bani (1971), 
Ganakantha Samaj (1972), Janapada (1973), and Bangabarta (1973). After Bangladesh was 
liberated, The Pakistan Observer was renamed as The Bangladesh Observer. 
Immediately after independence, the newspapers suffered a major blow when most of 




curbed the press freedom, on a plea of “prohibition of prejudicial acts” (Ahmed, p.18). In 1975, 
the government took over ownership and management of four daily newspapers and the rest of 
the seven dailies were banned promulgating the Newspapers (Annulment of Declaration) 
Ordinance (Ahmed, p. 25). HM Ershad, who came to power on March 24, 1982, and appointed 
himself chief martial law administrator, suspended freedom of expression and banned 693 
newspapers before his rule finally ended in 1991 (Gonzalez-Foerster, 1994, p. 65). From 1975 to 
1980, when Bangladesh experienced many military takeovers, the prime targets of rebellious 
soldiers were the newspapers, radio and TV stations (Ahmed, 2006, p. 10).  
In the wake of the fall of autocratic rule in 1990, an agreement was reached in a joint 
declaration of the political alliances, highlighting the process of democratic transition, including 
ensuring freedom of press (Ahmed, 2006, p. 10). The interim government, which assumed power 
after the fall of the Ershad regime in 1991, brought some amendments to the Special Powers Act 
and Printing Presses and Publications Act which relaxed some of the boundaries on the press 
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 11). Since then, privately owned TV and radio channels were allowed and 
dozens of news and entertainment-based TV and radio outlets were opened. After economic 
reforms, particularly adoption of free market economic policies in the early 2000s, the number of 
media in Bangladesh increased significantly. Khadimul Islam and Mohammad Yousuf (2017) 
found the media system of Bangladesh to be “neither libertarian nor authoritarian, but 
somewhere in the middle” (p. 6). However, they contend that the Bangladeshi media is “slowly 
moving in the direction of libertarianism” with the number of private television channels 
increasing (p. 6). The country has a total of 1,244 print media outlets, 477 of them are registered, 
826 of them are daily newspapers and 273 are weeklies. It has 44 TV channels, but 26 of them 




the number of state-owned FM transmitters is 32. The number of privately owned FM radio is 28 
and number of community radio is 32 (Rahman, 2016, p. 326). 
Use of Power to Issue and Revoke Licenses 
Politicians benefit by regulating the entry of firms into particular industries (Djankov, et 
al., 2006). In the media industry, this is particularly true. By acting as the gatekeeper for the 
media industry, government enforced 1973’s The Printing Presses and Publications (Declaration 
and Registration) Act, in force to regulate media entry through licensure. It gave government 
officials, locally known as district magistrates, the power to grant permission to publish 
newspapers. The law provides the magistrates with the power to cancel the certificate. Clause 
20(a) declares that the government can ban a newspaper if anything morally unacceptable is 
published in it. This also gives government the power to seize any uncertified newspaper 
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 21).  
According to Clause 26, all newspapers must provide government with four 
complimentary copies of each publication. The Ministry of Information controls broadcast 
licensing for both commercial and community outlets. Television stations have occasionally been 
closed apparently arbitrarily, on the plea of breaching broadcasting regulations. Thus, the 
government has monopoly power to grant or revoke permission for a media outlet that may or 
may not enter the media business. The government often reminds media outlets that they can 
revoke a license if television channels do not listen to government orders. All successive 
governments irrespective of their nature either elected or military use The Printing Presses and 
Publications Act in both providing license to their party men and revoking licenses of outlets 




In the 13 years it was in power, the BAL government issued licenses to over 35 private 
TV channels, 12 FM Radio stations, and 32 community radio stations. The BNP-led government 
issued licenses to 10 TV channels (Rahman, 2012).  
Along with the Printing Presses and Publications Act, the government in 1975 formulated 
the “Newspapers (Annulment of Declaration) Ordinance” and banned all political weeklies 
except the four taken over by the government. Using 1973’s Printing Presses and Publications 
law, the government in 2010 banned a pro-opposition vernacular daily newspaper called Dainik 
Amar Desh and arrested its editor, Mahmudur Rahman, in 2013. After being held in prison for 
more than three-and-a-half years, the editor was released on bail, but his newspaper remained 
suspended. He faces 70 legal charges including sedition and unlawful publication of a hacked 
conversation between the judges of International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh (ICT,B) and an 
external consultant (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
A military-led government came to power in 2007 under the claim of an emergency. 
After taking power, it shutdown transmission of CSB News, the nation’s first 24-hour Bangla 
news channel, for “forgery” as government officials were apparently unhappy about transmission 
of unrest in the nation. In June 2013, the BAL government halted the broadcast of other private 
channels, Diganta TV and Islamic TV, on allegations of airing provocative programs to whip up 
public sentiment. Both channels were tied to the opposition BNP and Bangladesh Jammat-e-
Islami (BJI). Ekushey TV was shut down by the BNP-Jamaat government in 2002 (Rahman, 
2012, p. 87) and in 2010 Channel One, owned by a close friend of former prime minister 
Khaledai Zia’s son, was banned (Banglapaedia; Haq, 2014b; Rahman, 2012). Under the Press 




for “the purpose preserving the freedom of the press and maintaining and improving standard of 
newspapers and news agencies in Bangladesh.” The Press Council has formulated Code of 
Conduct for Bangladeshi journalists. Apart from the Code of Conduct, the Council often issues 
statutory order asking journalists what to follow and what not. In a statement, Bangladesh Press 
Council in 2019 issued instructions regarding court reporting, urging media not to publish any 
news or article that might influence the under-trial cases ("Press Council asks media not to 
publish news that influence trial," 2019). Other than these, the Information Ministry of the 
government often issues instructions, both written and verbal, for journalists and forms 
committee to oversee the activities of the media (Bangladesh govt forms cell to monitor media," 
2020).   
Monopolies and Political Ownership 
Both the major political parties who have altered power since 1991 follow the same path 
of giving license for private television channels to party members, particularly members of 
parliaments, ministers, senior party leaders and their trusted and ideologically tied businessmen 
(Razzaque, 2013, p. VIII, 36-39). These actions curb the freedom of the said press. The ruling 
political elites always favor those financial elites who can contribute to their politics both 
materially and politically. No one can acquire a private television license without the ruling 
party’s patronage in Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2003, p. 20). A majority of the newspapers and 
most of the private television channels are aligning themselves with one of the main political 
factions (BBC, 2016).  
There are, however, a few exceptions. They are three leading English-language dailies: 




Alo. None of these media outlets extend direct support to any of two major political parties and 
owners of these media outlets were not directly involved in the politics of these parties.  
Issuing TV licenses to party members was initiated during the BNP regime (2001—
2006). Ten private satellite television channel licenses were given to all the front rank BNP 
leaders and their party men. In the following years, the BAL government followed the same path 
by giving private television licenses to those who were their party men or businessmen affiliated 
to party. In the years since 2010, the BAL government has issued licenses to 35 individuals. The 
information ministry issued 16 private satellite channel licenses in the fiscal year of 2013-14 
alone (Annual Report, 2015; Mamun, 2015). The domination of ownerships in broadcast media 
started fading when the BAL government shut down the channels owned by rival political 
members and began selling them to others after assuming power in 2009 (Haq, 2014). The BAL 
government banned three TV stations belonging to BNP and Jamaat leaders while the military-
backed interim government, which ran the country from 2007 to 2008, shut down another 
channel. 
Constitutional and legal provisions 
The Bangladesh constitution has guaranteed freedom of thought and conscience, freedom 
of speech and expression and freedom of press (Bangladesh Const. art. 39). But the country has 
several laws that allow press censorship (Bangladesh Const. art. 39, § 2). The section stipulates 
the authorities can enact laws that curb press freedom, subject to “reasonable restrictions” in the 
interests of the “security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency 
or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence” 




Powers Act 1974 (now annulled), Official Secrets Act, 1923 and ICT Act, 2006. Recently, the 
country enacted another law titled the Digital Security Act, defying widespread outcry from all 
walks of life in society including from journalists and rights groups (“Digital Security Bill,” 
2018). Amnesty International said the “vague and overly broad provisions” of the new law might 
be used to “intimidate and imprison journalists and social media users, silence dissent and carry 
out invasive forms of surveillance” (Amnesty, 2018). Top editors in Dhaka urged Bangladesh's 
government to overhaul the law saying it will curb press freedom (Mahmud, 2018). International 
watchdogs like Human Rights Watch have condemned the law saying it is meant to silence 
critics (“Bangladesh: New Law,” 2018). The latest World Press Freedom Index prepared by 
Reporters Without Borders says that Bangladesh slid four notches and is now 150th in the index 
(“Press Freedom: Bangladesh,” 2019). Meanwhile, in a recent article in Bangladesh’s largest 
daily, Prothom Alo, on the occasion of the latest World Press Freedom Day, former BBC 
journalist Kamal Ahmed (2019) pointed out that “informal and undeclared censorship” from 
unseen sources (practically from various government agencies including intelligence agencies) is 
one of the two primary threats to the press freedom in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2019). The other 
threat is the cases filed on the pleas of “Defamation” and “Hurting sentiment,” particularly in the 
issues of religion and the country’s liberation war, either under the Information and 
Communication Technology Act (ICT Act)  or under The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 
and recently under Digital Security Act. The country has long witnessed arbitrary use of the law 
on these two pleas -- “Defamation” and “Hurting sentiment”, particularly to silence dissenting 
voices. Kamal says the government agencies shut down news portals and newspaper whenever 





Journalist Associations and Professionalism 
Bangladesh has a good number of associations of journalists. Jatiya Press Club (National 
Press Club) with over 1,000 members is situated in the capital city of Dhaka. The club provides a 
forum for political, social and cultural groups and individuals, for holding press briefings and 
seminars (Media Landscapes, n.d.). Like the trade unions, the National Press Club is also divided 
into the groups that are aligned with the two large political parties (Media Landscapes, n.d.). 
There are other associations called Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ) and Dhaka 
Union of Journalists. The offices of both are housed in the National Press Club building, making 
the building a hub for journalists.  
In addition, the Dhaka Reporters’ Unity (DRU) is the largest body of reporters of Dhaka-
based newspapers, television and radio, online portals, and news agencies. Founded in 1995 to 
work for the interests of reporters, it has now 1,500 members. DRU organizes discussions, 
workshops and computer courses for its members. Politics has less of an influence in DRU than 
in the National Press Club. 
In addition, there are a number of beat-based associations. These include the Bangladesh 
Parliament Journalists’ Association, Dhaka Sub-Editors Council, Bangladesh Photo Journalists 
Association and the Television Camera Journalists Association.  All work to protect the interests 
of their members (Media Landscapes, n.d.).  
The Editors’ Council is an organization of editors of the highest-circulation newspapers 
in the country. Formed in 2013, the organization aims to play an active role in protecting press 
freedom, developing professionalism, and strengthening the editorial institution (Media 
Landscapes, n.d.). It often issues statements against government policies or actions that go 




Association of Bangladesh (NOAB) is an organization of newspaper owners. They often use 
their platform to bargain with the government on different business-related issues (Media 
Landscapes, n.d.). 
These associations are not active in formulating professional guidelines for the 
journalists. A search of their websites could not find any such documents. Some of them do not 
even have websites. However, the government enacted a set of Code of Conduct in 1993 under 
the Press Council Act, which was amended in 2002, for the Newspapers, News Agencies and 
Journalists of Bangladesh. The 25-point code (reproduced in Appendix B) calls on journalists to 
be truthful and accurate, buts asks them “[n]ot to publish any news or publication detrimental to 
National Integrity, Independence, Sovereignty, Oneness of State and Constitution of 
Bangladesh” (see Appendix B). In 2018, the government also passed a bill of Broadcasting 
Policy, proposing restrictions on the transmission of program, news or advertisements ‘harmful 
to the country’s history and image, public interest or law and order’ by television and radio 
networks or online media (Rahman, 2018).  
Nationalism and Religion in the Bangladeshi media 
Ted Rall (2019) argues that while there is an accepted belief among corporate news 
outlets that they are responsible for protecting national interests, it should not be the job of 
journalists. Most of the media outlets in Bangladesh are also aligned with the nationalistic 
movements and consider the support of that movement part of their journalistic work (Khatun, 
Abir, Rhaman & Rahman, 2017, p. 98). Dhaka-based journalist Udisa Islam (2019) argues that 
apart from legal barriers, self-censorship and journalists’ own allegiance to the power structures 
including the political institutions and ideologies are the two big threats to press freedom in 




political structures and ideologies (Udisa, 2019). Based on a survey conducted on 100 
Bangladeshi journalists aiming at figuring out the relationship between personality traits and 
some specific psychological occurrences in journalistic work settings, Khan (2005) contends that 
there is a “clear indication of noticeable relationship between journalists’ personality and their 
occupational behavior” (p. 79). Inferring the study result, it can be said that journalist’s 
personality traits influence the media content. 
Since its inception in 1971, Bangladesh has developed a unique confrontational political 
system stemmed from the clash of nationalistic movements. Bangladeshi society is sharply 
polarized over what should be the nationalism of the country (Hossain, 2015, p. 2, 7). Country’s 
two major political camps – one is led by BAL and the other is by its arch enemy BNP which 
have been exchanging power in turn almost since the liberation of the country – are pursuing 
politics based on two different ideologies. Those are: Bengali nationalism and Bangladeshi 
nationalism respectively. The two nationalisms are a bit opposite to each other in terms of their 
connections to the religion in particular. The advocates of Bengali nationalism say the idea of 
secular Bengali nationalism is based on the cultures and ethos practiced by Bengali-speaking 
people. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi nationalism, according to its proponents, is a 
philosophy primarily based on the culture and ethos of the people of the territory of Muslim 
majority Bangladesh, irrespective of their ethno-religious identities (Hossain, 2015, p. 3, 16).  
Political scientists hold that the Bangladeshi society has been polarized almost vertically 
on the question of national identity and political philosophy, creating a sustained political 
instability and uncertainty (Hossain, 2015). They also think that Bangladesh’s longstanding 




maintains that Bengali nationalism is culturally in close proximity with Hindu religion while 
Bangladeshi nationalism is pro-Muslim. Hindus are the dominant religious group in the 
neighboring India which played the role of a midwife to separate East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) from the West Pakistan (Kann, 2013).  
As would be expected, when the society is polarized on the question of nationalism 
thanks to its links with religion and journalists are sharply divided along party lines (Hasan, n.d., 
p. 163), that polarization will influence journalism. These polarizations and divisions essentially 
force journalists to adopt self-censorship whenever issues connected with their interests and 
ideologies get in the way of journalism.   
Drawing on the above discussion, we can easily infer that the media content in 
Bangladesh is widely influenced by several factors like government (political institutions), 
constitutional and legal provisions, nationalism, religion and media institutions (types of 






Findings and Discussion 
 
All of the journalists, media experts, and academics examined for this thesis indicated 
that the practice of self-censorship plagues Bangladeshi media. According to newspaper articles, 
the country’s president (“গণিাধ্যমি সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ দরকার: রাষ্ট্রপশত," 2016) and the capital 
Dhaka’s police chief (“জাতীয় স্বামথ ে 'সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ' দরকার গণিাধ্যমি: শিএিশপ 
কশিিনার”, 2019) also openly called on the journalists to exercise self-censorship. In response, 
Bangladesh’s largest circulation daily newspaper, Prothom Alo, wrote an editorial and criticized 
the police chief’s call for self-censorship saying: “[W]hen the [police] commissioner says 
something like that, it spells bad news for the journalists” ("'Self-censorship' of the media," 
2019). 
Many of examples of self-censorship among the Bangladeshi media exist. In his blog, 
British journalist David Bergman (2019), who worked as a journalist in Bangladesh for years and 
was forced to leave the country, cited a glaring example of self-censorship. Bergman used the 
example of journalists having access to a recorded telephone conversation between Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina and her UK Awami League party leaders. In the recorded conversation, 
Hasina referred to the question of whether Khaleda Zia, the leader of the opposition Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) who was in jail at that time, would be allowed out of jail. Hasina 
emphatically said in the conversation that if Tarique Rahman (Khaleda’s son and now BNP’s 
acting chairman who is now self-exiling in UK) shows his arrogance with the prime minister, 
Khaleda Zia would never be able to come out of jail in her lifetime (Bergman, 2019). Bergman 
noted that “not a single media outlet in Bangladesh (as far as this blog can make out) actually 
reported on this conversation although this video was widely distributed” as “no one would dare 




Another example of self-censorship comes from a copy-editor of Bangladesh’s highest 
circulated English-language daily newspapers, The Daily Star. The copy editor, Badiuzzaman 
Bay, demonstrated how he slants the news article by changing words and terms to make content 
more acceptable to perceived powers within society.  For example, Bay noted that “the system” 
is used instead of “the government,” “the student wing of the ruling party” instead of 
“Bangladesh Chhatra League,” and the vague term “something else” is used instead of  
“military” (Bay, 2019). As Bay suggests,  directly mentioning of the government, Bangladesh 
Chhatra League or the military in the news may entail risks for the concerned journalists and the 
daily. 
Journalists do not exercise as much restraint when mentioning the opposition political 
party, BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party), as Bay (2019) noted, “BNP becomes more than 
BNP,” suggesting that journalists can mention BNP in any case no matter what, as it will not 
entail any risk. Mentioning the BNP by name will please the ruling party BAL (Bay, 2019). 
As Bay describes self-censorship among Bangladeshi journalists, “Names are replaced by 
titles, facts deleted, if not altered, and headings robbed of their ‘spark’” (Bay, 2019). Bay 
attributes two factors behind the self-censorship: the government and the employer.  He puts it 
this way: 
My deleted sentences, in the end, are a painful reminder of all the times that I had to 
swallow my pride, toe the line drawn either by the government or by my employers oh-so 
afraid of consequences, and put an end to the illusion of control over my own life (Bay, 
2019). 
The journalists examined in this study willfully spoke of the sources of self-censorship 




pushing journalists and Bangladeshi media as a whole to exercise self-censorship). Different 
journalists spoke of two or three or four different sources of self-censorship, although many of 
them touched on the same reasons. An analysis of the reasons the journalists referred to for the 
self-censorship, a total of six sources that push Bangladeshi media to exercise self-censorship 
were found. The sources of self-censorship are:  
1. Legal Barriers 
2. Government Interference  
3. Ownership  
4. Advertising 
5. Political Partisanship as Unprofessional Activity 
6. Religion 
Legal Barriers  
As discussed earlier, the country’s legal structure regarding press freedom or media 
freedom has established several laws and acts that the government or the various government 
agencies can exploit to influence media practices. The ICT Act and the Digital Security Act, in 
particular, have created a sense of fear among the journalists. As many as 32 journalists told 
Reuters that they are “living in fear of ever-tightening media laws and engaging in self-
censorship as a result” (Paul, Quadir, & Siddiqui, 2018). Daily Manabzamain editor Matiur 
Rahman Chowdhury told Reuters that he will at times make the decision to not publish a news 
report “purely to save the reporter” as he knows “the risks involved in publishing it” (Paul, 
Quadir, & Siddiqui, 2018). 
At times the pressure on journalists is less subtle. Mahfuz Anam, who has been the editor 




fearlessly, but now, he seldom writes a column. Anam has been charged with defamation and 
treason in more than 80 cases filed by ruling BAL party workers in 2016, with damages sought 
exceeding $8 billion (Paul, Quadir, & Siddiqui, 2018). 
Fahmidul Haq, who teaches journalism, says that the ICT Act and the Digital Security 
Act “have emerged to be tough laws in respect to freedom of expression” and cases are being 
filed against journalists and online users (Haq, 2019). British journalist David Bergman writes 
that government party activists have filed dozens of criminal cases against the same newspaper 
editors. In addition, “dozens of journalists and editors have been arrested under the vague and 
arbitrary Information, Communication, Technology and Communication Act; and there is a high 
degree of censorship and - rather obviously - self-censorship. Television is particularly 
controlled” (Bergman, 2018). 
 Journalist Kamal Ahmed said misuse of the provision of contempt court and libel suits is 
being used in Bangladesh to influence journalists. “Even treason case was not spared” (Ahmed, 
2017).  Talking about the recently enacted Digital Security Act, Mahfuz Anam said the very 
existence of the Act would destroy “all of enthusiasm and efforts of journalists” (Anam, 2019). 
Anam attributed the Digital Security Act and libel suits to creating a sense of fear in the 
journalistic arena, resulting in a sharp rise in self-censorship. As one journalist said, “We don’t 
publish most of the news items nowadays” (Anam, 2019). In an interview with The Daily Star, 
the country’s leading Bengali-language daily, Prothom Alo editor Matiur Rahman said some 
laws like the amended ICT Act of 2013 and Digital Security Act have made journalism risky 
and, as a result, journalists cannot write or publish what they think should be published (Rahman, 
2019). 




laws, whether they are used or not, serve to influence journalists out of fear of facing legal 
problems. In short, the mere existence of legal barriers, whether used or not, can prompt 
journalists to self-censor. And as journalists seem to understand, if these legal barriers are used 
against one journalist it can serve as a powerful reminder to other journalists to not step out of 
line.    
Government Interference 
While legal barriers can be powerful instruments of self-censorship, these legal barriers 
are rarely aligned with a single ruling party. For example, defamation laws are available to all 
people within society, even though certain groups might be more likely to use them against the 
press. The second factor in self-censorship, government interference, differs from the factor of 
legal barriers in significant ways. Government interference describes the very real political 
pressure that ruling political parties put on journalists, either openly or covertly.   
The ruling political party is synonymous with government in Bangladesh. Government 
exploits all the tools available to it to mount pressure on media outlets. Government enacts and 
uses various laws against journalists and media houses. In addition to government using the legal 
apparatus and sometimes arbitrary orders to control journalists, it also often engages in 
intimidation tactics. These tactics can include things such as filing legal cases against journalists, 
phone calls from intelligence agents, barring journalists from covering certain events, and 
blocking government ads to certain media outlets (Bergman, 2018). Government ads are the 
primary source of revenue for the media in Bangladesh, particularly for the newspapers. It is 
estimated that the government ads comprise as much as 70 percent of ad market in Bangladesh 
(Ghatack, 2019). 




in, “We can’t publish that because of the bad political atmosphere”). Talking to the Committee to 
Protect Journalists, Matiur Rahman, the editor of Bangladesh’s top daily Prothom Alo, said the 
current BAL government thinks that “independent media is working against it” (Committee to 
Protect Journalists, 2015). Matiur Rahman claimed that his “staffers are often followed by 
intelligence agents” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2015).  
This pressure, both covert and overt, has consequences for what is published. Mahfuz 
Anam also reported government pressure. As he told the Committee to Protect Journalists, “Over 
the past year, the media has gone into a mode of self-censorship." Anam alleged that the 
government has become “totally intolerant to critical voices" (Committee to Protect Journalists, 
2015). Photojournalist Shahidul Alam, one of the persons of the year selected by Time magazine 
in 2018, said much of the media has “essentially made themselves spokespeople for the 
government” (Alam, 2019). He said whenever “someone says anything that does not toe the 
[ruling] party line somewhere and another, it is blocked” (Alam, 2019).  Daily New Age editor 
Nurul Kabir said journalists are “intimidated directly or indirectly by the government agencies as 
well as the ruling party hoodlums” (Kabir, 2015). Kabir (2015) said the government closed down 
several television channels and newspaper editors were arrested. He himself was “subject to 
different kinds of intimidation many times” (Kabir, 2015). 
Forms of intimidation can also be covert and subtle. Reazuddin Ahmed, a former editor 
of the daily newspaper News Today, said restrictions come from the government through “novel 
unwritten means” and as a result media have started exercising self-censorship ("গণিাধ্যমির 
স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা", 2010). By “novel unwritten means,” Ahmed essentially referred to phone 
calls from intelligence agencies and other forms of intimidation which were mentioned by others 




of trust among the people in the media and which is in its peak (Ahmed, 2019). In an interview 
with Deutsche Welle, journalist Shaukat Mahmood said the media outlets get phone calls from 
different government agencies with instructions about what should and should not be published 
(Swapan, 2019). Fahmidul Haq said a cloud of fear has swept across the country which is a key 
obstacle to freedom of expression (Haq, 2019). He said much of the media are now under 
government control (Haq, 2019). In the interview with The Daily Star, Prothom Alo editor 
Matiur Rahman said his daily gets a very little of the government ads (Rahman, 2019). In one of 
his articles, daily Manab Zamin editor Matiur Rahman Chowdhury (2018) shed light on a 
gloomy picture of self-censorship his colleagues are exercising in fear of losing jobs that 
stemmed from the government interference or “bad political atmosphere”. Chowdhury said 
journalists can lose their jobs or their access to information and sources because of their 
reportage.  This at times happens even without the knowledge of their editors (Chowdhury, 
2018).  
Chowdhury referenced a practice where if a journalist angers powerful governmental 
authorities, the editor of the particular journalist receives phone call from that powerful quarter 
with a message that the particular journalist should be fired immediately. And Chowdhury’s 
claim is seconded by Prothom Alo journalist Tipu Sultan who told the Committee to Protect 
Journalists that "those not supporting the ruling Awami League are in the line of fire" 
(Committee to Protect Journalists, 2015). Bangladesh Awami League has been in power since 
2009. 
Government interference plays an important role in journalistic self-censorship. 
Government in Bangladesh attempts to overtly influence the work that journalists do through 




pressuring both journalists and editors.  However, government also works covertly through 
unwritten rules, limiting access to information and sources, and changing the rules of the game.  
Ownership   
As the literature on journalistic self-censorship notes, ownership often plays an important 
role as to what content journalists feel it acceptable to cover. Ownership can influence news 
content by directly issuing orders to cover or not to cover certain people or events or issues, but 
it can also influence content through more subtle means. These more subtle influences can be 
everything from hiring or promotion of editors to changes in newsroom policy. 
Ownership influences journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh in several different 
ways. Since the government controls broadcast licenses, owners pressure journalists to engage in 
self-censorship to make sure the government does not cancel their broadcast license. Media 
owners, however, also have many different economic interests, some related to the government 
and some not. Media owners work to make sure that journalists do not have a negative influence 
on those other economic sources. 
Mentioning that the current government has issued licenses for many television channels, 
journalist Probhash Amin said the journalists are engaging in self-censorship not only because of 
their fear of the government, but because it serves to protect their own interests and their loyalty 
to a certain political party (Amin, 2019). Bdnews24.com editor Toufique Imroje Khalidi alleged 
that “wicked people” have become the owners of the Bangladeshi media and that’s why the 
problem of self-censorship has arisen (Khalidi, 2015). Khalidi (2015) attributed having other 
businesses by media owners to one of the reasons of self-censorship by the particular media 
outlet. The media owners obtain licenses by “maintaining relations with politicians and pay toll 




Echoing Khalidi, journalist Maswood Kamal said the owners of as much as “95 per cent 
of Bangladeshi media organizations” set up media outlets for their “business interests” (Kamal, 
2020). Kamal (2020) said rich people and industrialists open media houses and maintain 
journalists as their henchmen to protect their properties. Kamal (2020) alleged that The Daily 
Star and Prohtom Alo – Bangladesh’s two top dailies – did not publish a report against KFC just 
because they were owned by the same owner. Referring to the editor of another leading 
vernacular daily newspaper, Ittefaq, being a minister for two terms, Kamal asked whether the 
daily published any news on the corruption in his ministry (Kamal, 2020).  
In an interview with Safenewsrooms.org, journalist Supriti Dhar said the media owners 
usually exercise “some sort of censorships, especially if it goes against their interests, monetary 
or otherwise” (Dhar, 2018). Dhar (2018) said the owners “usually control the editors and through 
them all the journalists working at such media houses”. The newsrooms “have to operate as per 
the leanings of the owners, given that the media industry is very owner-driven” (Dhar, 2018).  
In an interview with Deutsche Welle, The Daily Observer editor Iqbal Sobhan 
Chowdhury said that in the past owners used to set up media outlets with a certain noble vision, 
but it has now “become like a job, rather than a profession thanks to corporate culture” 
(Chowdhury, 2019), suggesting that media outlets as well as journalists are now more interested 
in protecting their job for their livelihood, rather than upholding journalistic values, i.e. telling 
the truth despite odds. In such a culture, neither media outlets nor journalists publish reports 
which entail risks. Chowdhury (2019) said that against this backdrop many journalists are 
making compromises either with the government or with business establishments and with other 






Advertising is an important influence on self-censorship within journalism, although 
often journalists seek to deny that influence. As the profitability of journalism has decreased over 
the years, the need to attract and retain advertisers has become ever more important. In 
journalistic content, this can mean writing stories that will attract or help retain advertisers, but 
also withholding certain stories or information that aligns with the interests of advertisers.  
While the influence of ownership is a real concern among Bangladeshi journalists, that 
concern is often coupled with fears about the influence of advertisers. As noted earlier, the 
government in Bangladesh controls up to 70 percent of the advertising market, giving 
government the ability to pressure journalists by withholding advertising revenue. However, 
journalists also reported feeling influence from private-sector advertisers. 
Saiful Islam Chowdhury, a Dhaka University faculty member who is also a former 
journalist, said journalists sometimes work as “a puppet of the government or sometimes as a 
puppet of multinational companies” (Chowdhury, 2019). According to Chowdhury, it is more 
important to journalists to serve the needs of advertisers and media owners than to serve the 
public (Chowdhury, 2019). Chowdhury said a culture of fear has gripped journalists thanks to 
pressure from political and economic factors (Chowdhury, 2019) as the newspaper revenue 
model based on advertisement is failing to some extent in Bangladesh, much like the rest of the 
world (Uddin, 2020). Bhorer Kagoj Editor Shyamal Dutta said the Bangladeshi media don’t 
write “against corporate houses fearing losing revenue from advertisements” ("‘গণিাধ্যমির 
স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা," 2010). Iqbal Sobhan Chowdhury (2019) noted that the media sometimes 
refuse to oppose the requests of advertisers. In the corporate culture, the owners and advertisers 




 Against this backdrop, sometimes journalists refuse to stand up to the influence of 
advertisers (Chowdhury, 2019). Journalist Tushar Abdullah, head of news for television news 
channel Somoy News, admitted that they often face pressure from the advertisers (University of 
Asia Pacific, 2016). “Before airing a news item,” Abdullah said, “I need to rethink several times 
whether I should air it or not; whether it will enrage that brother or that sister.” Abdullah 
suggested that they always need to think twice if their news reports will enrage anyone from 
either from political leadership or from corporate world. Abdullah expressed his dismay saying: 
“My [press] freedom is being sold only for Tk 500 Tk 800 Tk 2000,” (University of Asia Pacific, 
2016). Journalist J. E. Mamun, head of news for television channel ATN Bangla, alleged that the 
electronic media in Bangladesh has become accountable to government, the ruling political party 
and to the financiers who give the media ads ("‘গণিাধ্যমির স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা," 2010).  
Partisanship and Unprofessional Activity  
Some of the journalists and media experts analyzed for this project identified political 
partisanship as being an important factor in self-censorship. These journalists tended to see that 
partisanship (or what some labeled advocacy journalism) as falling short of the professional 
responsibilities expected of journalists in Bangladesh. 
Saiful Islam Chowdhury, (2019) in his opinion piece in Deutsche Welle, said partisan 
loyalty (i.e., loyalty toward a certain political party or group) has emerged as an Achilles’ heel in 
Bangladeshi journalism. As I discussed earlier, Bangladesh’s society is sharply polarized on 
political questions and so are journalists. Many of the journalists side with the political party they 
like. They show their loyalty to their party both covertly and overtly. Chowdhury noted that 
thanks to the culture of political loyalty, a tendency of advocacy journalism has increased widely 




  Tushar Abdullah, head of news at Somoy TV, said Bangladesh’s journalism has turned 
out to be partisan journalism (University of Asia Pacific, 2016). Describing the state of 
journalists, Abdullah said journalists, while producing a news item, think about their future 
standing within a political party or professional organizations. Could they be the minister (press) 
after five years?  Will they be members of Press Club, Press Council or the Press Institute of 
Bangladesh? In Bangladesh, journalists who show their loyalty to a certain political party 
throughout their journalistic careers are often rewarded toward the end of their journalistic 
career. These rewards might include a position in government if the political party they are 
aligned with stays in power. These positions can include the post of Minister (Press), a lucrative 
position in Bangladesh embassies, the post of Press Secretary (PS) or Assistant Press Secretary 
(APS) of the Prime Minister or with any position, or a position in the government or in the state 
run bodies like the Press Council and Press Institute of Bangladesh. These positions are like 
dream destinations for the journalists having political partisan loyalty. So they always think, 
while doing the reportage, as to how they can serve the particular political party best so that he or 
she can get any of the above mentioned positions toward the end of their journalistic career. 
That’s why Abdullah said those journalists always feel pressure from within themselves to serve 
a certain political party (University of Asia Pacific, 2016). 
 Journalist Mustafa Feroz, head of news for Bangla Vision TV channel, (2020) said 
journalists are divided along political party lines and this phenomenon makes them more 
responsible to the respective party than to the journalism profession. Feroz added, “Whenever 
their party comes to power, that group of journalists tries to show more allegiance to that party” 
(Feroz, 2020).  




partisan journalist engages in self-censorship while doing news reporting. He used this 
hypothetical example: 
I’m running a newspaper of BNP’s (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) ideology. What I will 
do is: I will intentionally publish a news item on the weaknesses of Awami League (the 
arch-enemy of BNP). . . .  This is because of my political bias (Mishu, 2016). 
Journalist Masood Kamal (2020) said journalists belonging to a certain political camp 
would never find anything wrong in the governance of their party when it is in power. Kamal 
said, “This is very unfortunate that journalists in Bangladesh behave like political goons” 
(Kamal, 2020). 
Journalist Shaukat Mahmood talked about the reasons behind the partisan loyalty of 
journalists (Mahmood, 2019). Mahmood (2019) noted that apart from shared ideological beliefs, 
there are other reasons for journalists being partisans. First of all, a pro-government journalist 
gets advantages in securing jobs (both in the government and in the state-run media outlets) and 
secures social advantages such as land allocation opportunities (by the government agencies), 
and the opportunity for foreign trips (Mahmood, 2019).  
Dhaka University faculty member Gitiara Nasreen alleged that media can be purchased. 
She said you can make “the media speak either against or in favor of any issue” ("গণিাধ্যমির 
স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা," 2010). Nasreen suggested that media outlets or journalists write stories 
in favor of somebody or something or decide not to publish stories or self-censor if they are 
purchased (i.e. influenced by the means of money and/or political power). 
Fahmidul Haq (2019) said there are some “dependent media outlets” which “work to 
divert normal political activities to a different direction” (Haq, 2019). By the term “dependent 




particularly from the ruling government or any other power structures. These media outlets often 
embark on a propaganda campaign in favor of their masters and while doing so, they resort to 
self-censorship and the distortion of information.   
Religion  
Religious topics are sensitive in Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s largest circulation daily, 
Prothom Alo, had to discontinue its weekly satire magazine Alpin after it published a cartoon-cat 
named Mohammad (Majumder, 2007). The cartoonist was arrested, the publisher of newspaper 
apologized and appealed for forgiveness following street protests about the publication. 
Given the sensitivity of the religious topics, journalists and media outlets often exercise 
self-censorship while publishing religious news. Freedom House, a US-government funded, non-
profit research and advocacy organization, reported in 2019 that online journalists and social 
media commentators “continue to report a climate of self-censorship on political and religious 
topics in Bangladesh” (Freedom House, 2019). Journalist Supriti Dhar, in the interview with 
Safenewsrooms.org, said after the government machinery, religious “extremist groups” are one 
of the pressure groups that “force newsroom to censor” (Dhar, 2018). There are several Islam-
based political parties and groups that take to the streets whenever they believe the media have 
offended their religious beliefs. However, none of other journalists based on whose views this 












This project set out to find answers to one main research question: What factors do 
journalists see as the most important influence on self-censorship in Bangladesh? 
Through an analysis of interviews and published reports by journalists and other media 
experts, a number of factors influencing self-censorship have been identified. The most 
important factors, and the most commonly discussed by journalists and media experts, were legal 
barriers, governmental influence, and political partisanship as unprofessional activity. It is clear 
that in Bangladesh there exists a form of self-censorship that is enforced through institutional 
forces, whether those forces be judicial, governmental, or political party. Those institutional 
forces punish journalists who violate legal standards or do not reinforce the beliefs of the 
government or political party. Journalists who do reinforce those beliefs are rewarded with 
access to information, governmental positions, opportunities to travel and other rewards not 
commonly available to all people in Bangladesh. The study findings appear to lend credence to 
Peter Wood’s suspicion that “Cowardice and conformity-for-conformity’s-sake” to avoid hassle 
is responsible for most self-censorship (Peter Wood, 2019, p.604). 
Journalists and media experts also discussed ownership, advertising and religious beliefs 
as being factors, but these were less commonly acknowledged. It is interesting that even when 
journalists and media experts discussed these influences, they were often discussed as being part 
of the country’s institutional framework. For example, the fear of publishing content that will 
irritate advertisers was often discussed as a fear of losing governmental advertising. And the 
impact of ownership was at times linked to how government or political parties are connected to 
media ownership. 




project, it was believed that religion would be seen as an important element of self-censorship. 
Only one out of 38 journalists and a media watchdog identified for this project explicitly linked 
religion as a factor in self-censorship. However, this does not mean that religion is not an 
important element of self-censorship in Bangladesh.  Rather, it might be that religion (as some of 
the research in the literature review suggests), has become so closely intertwined with 
government and political parties that it is not seen as being separate from  institutional politics 
by journalists. In other words, religion is not separate from government and political parties, but 
is part of government and political parties. It can also be assumed that Bangladeshi journalists, 
on the question of religion, maintain “sphere of consensus” of the theory of media objectivity 
posited by journalism historian Daniel C. Hallin in his book The Uncensored War (1987).  
This study helps us understand how journalists adopt self-censorship into their work in 
Bangladesh. Self-censorship can be employed as a way to avoid punishment from powerful 
forces, providing journalists some degree of freedom to continue to work. And self-censorship 
can also be employed as a way to secure unethical personal gains. This study shows us how self-
censorship becomes the new normal for the journalists in Bangladesh. It also lends credence to 
the idea that news is a social construction and reinforces the idea that media content is dependent 
upon various forces that operate within any country. 
Horton (2011) argues that the agents/people/institutions who will have an “element of 
reluctance, and a feeling of resentment” while censoring should not be called the self-censors 
thanks to their unwillingness to censor (p. 100). Horton contends that the self-censorship caused 
of others’ action can be thought of as justified (Horton, 2011, p. 102). But those who censor 
themselves “on their own volition and being uncoerced by others are, according to Horton’s 




has got both of Horton’s types of self-censorships. An analysis of the six factors would clearly 
tell us that self-censorship stemming from Political Partisanship is a willful act. Journalists who 
exercise self-censorship for their political partisanship do it willingly, spontaneously and without 
coercion by others. So, in Horton’s view, it is true self-censorship. On the other hand, it was not 
known in this study whether or not the censors or a portion of censors (i.e., Bangladeshi 
journalists or the media outlets) exercise self-censorship show reluctance or some sort of 
reluctance in case of the other five factors – Legal Barriers, Governmental Interference, 
Ownership, Advertising, and Religion. All of these five factors are extra-personal i.e. the self-
censorship stemmed from these factors is exercised under coercion by extra-personal factors. So, 
the journalists and media outlets who self-censor for these five factors with reluctance and 
without their own volition can be justified, at least to some extent, as per Horton’s view. 
Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann (2013) categorize two types of self-censorship: One is 
public self-censorship and the other is private self-censorship. Public self-censorship is exercised 
in response to an externally existing censor or public censor. Private self-censorship is exercised 
in the absence of an external censor (i.e. without any coercion). In light of these views, 
Bangladesh has got both types of self-censorship. Again, private self-censorship which is 
exercised through an individual's “internalization of some external set of values,” such as “the 
norms of an association,” is called Private Self-censorship by Proxy. The second type of private 
self-censorship, exercised in response to an individual's suppression of his or her own attitudes 
even in the absence of an explicitly external or public influence, they term private self-
censorship by self-restraint. Bangladesh has all of these types of self-censorship. 
Bangladesh’s politics is rooted in the issue of nationalism and has been ever since the 




the issue of nationalism, too. Most of the journalists and the media outlets think that upholding 
the nationalism they believe in is their patriotic duty, while exercising journalism. In so doing, 
they think that it is their responsibility to write against the people belonging to the other side of 
the line of nationalism and to write in favor of the people belonging to their side. The 
partisanship comes from, in their words “patriotic conviction.” Most of the media outlets of the 
country and journalists proudly announce their conviction to defend and uphold the spirits of 
country’s liberation war ("চেতনায় মুক্তিযুদ্ধ কণ্ঠে মহাকাল," 2020; Jubayer, 2018; & Rahman, 
2018). In doing so, almost all of the media outlets and journalists think that they should write 
against the people and the political parties (mostly religion-based parties) who opposed the 
country’s liberation in 1971 and it is the unofficial/undeclared yet widely accepted policy of the 
media as a whole in Bangladesh. It seems that this issue falls in the Sphere of Consensus of 
Hallin’s model of objectivity. Given the sensitivity of the issue (i.e. country’s liberation), none 
dare to come out of this Sphere of Consensus, lending credence to Todd Gitlin’s claim that the 
“ideologies of the dominant social powers” sway journalists as to what stories should be covered 
(Gitlin, 1980, p. 250-251). So, when this issue comes before the journalists, they either self-
censor or embark on a propaganda campaign against the opposition.   
After the two biggest influences – legal and governmental – which entirely depend on the 
will of the ruling political structure, partisanship of journalist and ownership, which essentially 
come from the political philosophy of the journalists and the owners of the media, play the 
largest role in shaping media content in Bangladesh. Although religion does not have a visible 
influence on the media, it has a wider impact in the country’s politics and society and thus on 
journalism. It is suspected that a different methodology might be able to draw on the influence 




media to self-censor are well-linked with the country’s politics. It appears that journalism and 
politics are nothing but the two sides of the same coin. In other words, country’s politics play an 
instrumental role in shaping the media content in Bangladesh. If we think about improving 
journalism, I mean if we think of making journalism as it should be, this study gives us an 
important insight about what is not possible unless we think about improving the political 
climate of the country. It appears that journalism will never be able to reach a stage where it 
should be as long as long Bangladeshi politics allows it to do so.   
Project Limitations and Further Study 
While this study has identified some factors that push journalists and the media as a 
whole to exercise self-censorship, relying on published interviews and writings has its 
limitations. Due to the method used for this project, I was unable to ask how journalists work and 
to ask people to explain concepts or ideas in more depth. Clearly a study employing some form 
of in-depth analysis or ethnographic research would be a valuable addition to this project.  
Although the media-content influencing factors identified in this study clearly fit into the 
Hierarchy of Influence model, it’s difficult to demarcate which factor of influence comes from 
exactly which level as the study could not give us a detailed map of the dynamics of the factors 
and particularly when the boundaries of the levels of influence model are themselves fuzzy.  
Any future study employing methods such as in-depth interviews or ethnographic study 
could offset the shortcomings of this study. The study’s findings, however, give us an idea of the 
state of journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh. There has been not a lot of academic work on 
how self-censorship plays a role in Bangladeshi media. This study also gives us an idea about the 
socio-political structure of Bangladesh as well as how much that structure influences content 




beginning of a deeper understanding of how the workings of Bangladeshi media and its role as a 
vital institution of a democratic society and how self-censorship often obstructs the functioning 
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Code of Conduct 1993 (2002 as amended) for the Newspapers and News Agencies: 
 
1. Not to publish any news or publication detrimental to National Integrity, Independence, sovereignty, 
Oneness of State and Constitution of Bangladesh.  
2.  The War of Liberation and its spirit and ideals must be sustained and upheld, and any publication 
repugnant to it to be stopped. 
3. It is the responsibility of a journalist to keep people informed of issues which influence or attract them. 
News and commentaries are to be prepared and published showing full respect to the sensitivity and 
individual rights of newspaper readers as well as the people  
4. Truth and accuracy of information available are to be ensured as far as possible. 
5. Information received from reliable sources may be published in the public interest induced by honest 
intention and if facts presented therein are considered trustworthy by logical consideration, then a journalist 
is to be absolved from any adverse consequence for publication of such news. 
6. Unconfirmed reports or reports based on rumours shall be verified before publication and if found 
unreasonable on verification, be withheld from publication. 
7. News items whose contents are distorted and baseless or whose publication hinges on breach of trust not 
to be published. 
8. Newspapers and journalists having the right to express their views on controversial issues and in doing 
so: 
a) All events should be truthfully reported and views be clearly expressed. 
b) No report of an event is distorted to influence the readers. 
c) No news shall be distorted or slanted maliciously either in the main commentary or in the 
headline. 
d) Views on main news shall be presented clearly and fairly. 
9. The editor having the right to publish any advertisement signed by proper authorities in his/her 
newspaper even if it is apparently against any individual interest should not be slanderous or prejudicial to 
public interest. If protest is made with regard to such an advertisement, the editor shall print and publish it 
without any cost. 
10. Newspapers shall refrain from publishing news which is contemptuous or disrespectful to caste, creed, 
nationality and religion of any individual or the community or the country. For upholding national unity, 
communal prejudices and feelings of hatred and malice be discouraged. 
11. If a newspaper publishes any news which prejudices the interest and good name of an individual, 
agency, institution or group of people or any special category of people, then the newspaper concerned 
should provide opportunity to the aggrieved persons or institutions to publish their protest or state their 
point of view on the matter within a reasonable period of time. 
12. If the published news is damaging or improper, then withdrawal, corrigendum or explanation be made 
and in special cases, apology should be tendered. 
13. For the increase of circulation of newspaper no vulgar, derogatory, ghastly news and picture though 
attractive to the people, be published. 
14. Newspapers should adopt reasonable measures with a view to resisting crime and corruption. 
15. As extent and durability of the influence of newspapers is greater than that of other media, a journalist 
writing for newspaper shall particularly be cautious about the credibility and truthfulness of sources and 
shall also preserve his source material in order to avoid risks. 
16. It is the responsibility of the newspapers to publish news relating to case under trial and to publish the 
final judgment of the court to reveal the actual picture of issues relating to trial. But a journalist shall 
refrain from publishing such comment or opinion as is likely to influence an under-trial case, until the final 
verdict is announced. 
17. Rejoinder of the aggrieved party or parties directly involved with news published in a newspaper shall 
be quickly published in the same newspaper on such page as would easily draw the attention of the readers. 
The editor, while editing the rejoinder shall not change its basic character. 




obligation of the editor to publish the corrigendum on the same page and also express regrets. 
19. Malicious news should not be published. 
20. The editor is to accept full responsibility for all publications in the newspaper. 
21. A reporter while reporting a case of financial or other kind of irregularity shall, to the best of his ability, 
verify the facts in his report and shall incorporate adequate material to prove the truth of the matter 
reported. 
22. Any irresponsible publication to which no objection was taken cannot be source of news but a journalist 
cannot shirk his responsibility on the ground of reprinting the same. 
23. It is a responsibility of a journalist to highlight any news which projects degeneration of moral values in 
the society but it is also the moral responsibility of a journalist to maintain strict precaution in publishing 
news / photo involving man-woman relationship or any report relating to woman. 
24.  Any person who will join in a service of newspaper or new agency or any media of news shall be 
bound to take oath and sign in presence of the editor as per form “Ka” as attached with this Code of 
Conduct. 
25. Any publisher of a newspaper shall take oath and sign under section 11(2)(b) of the Press Council Act, 
as per form “Kha” as attached with this Code of Conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
